1 Overview

The Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160) is a severe implementation flaw in the OpenSSL library, which en-
ables attackers to steal data from the memory of the victim server. The contents of the stolen data depend on
what is there in the memory of the server. It could potentially contain private keys, TLS session keys, user
names, passwords, credit cards, etc. The vulnerability is in the implementation of the Heartbeat protocol,
which is used by SSL/TLS to keep the connection alive.

The objective of this lab is for students to understand how serious this vulnerability is, how the attack
works, and how to fix the problem. The affected OpenSSL version range is from 1.0.1 to 1.0.1f. The
version in the SEEDUbuntu 12.04 VM is 1.0.1.

Readings and videos. Detailed coverage of the Heartbleed attack can be found in the following:

• Chapter 20 of the SEED Book, Computer & Internet Security: A Hands-on Approach, 2nd Edition,
by Wenliang Du. See details at https://www.handsonsecurity.net

• Section 11 of the SEED Lecture, Internet Security: A Hands-on Approach, by Wenliang Du. See
details at https://www.handsonsecurity.net/video.html

Lab environment. This lab has been tested on our pre-built Ubuntu 12.04 VM, which can be downloaded
from the SEED website. If you are using our SEEDUbuntu 16.04 VM, this attack will not work, because
the vulnerability has already been patched. You can download the SEEDUbuntu 12.04 VM from the SEED
web site. If you have an Amazon EC2 account, you can find our VM from the “Community AMIs”. The
name of the VM is SEEDUbuntu12.04-Generic. It should be noted that Amazon’s site says that this
is a 64-bit VM; that is incorrect. The VM is 32-bit. However, this incorrect information does not cause any
problem.

2 Lab Environment

In this lab, we need to set up two VMs: one called attacker machine and the other called victim server.
We use the pre-built SEEDUbuntu 12.04 VM. The VMs need to use the NAT-Network adapter for the
network setting. This can be done by going to the VM settings, picking Network, and clicking the Adaptor
tag to switch the adapter to NAT-Network. Make sure both VMs are on the same NAT-Network.

The website used in this attack can be any HTTPS website that uses SSL/TLS. However, since it is
illegal to attack a real website, we have set up a website in our VM, and conduct the attack on our own
VM. We use an open-source social network application called ELGG, and host it in the following URL:

We need to modify the /etc/hosts file on the attacker machine to map the server name to the IP ad-
dress of the server VM. Search the following line in /etc/hosts, and replace the IP address 127.0.0.1
with the actual IP address of the server VM that hosts the ELGG application.
3 Lab Tasks

Before working on the lab tasks, you need to understand how the heartbeat protocol works. The heartbeat protocol consists of two message types: HeartbeatRequest packet and HeartbeatResponse packet. The client sends a HeartbeatRequest packet to the server. When the server receives it, it sends back a copy of the received message in the HeartbeatResponse packet. The goal is to keep the connection alive.

3.1 Task 1: Launch the Heartbleed Attack

In this task, students will launch the Heartbleed attack on our social network site and see what kind of damages can be achieved. The actual damage of the Heartbleed attack depends on what kind of information is stored in the server memory. If there has not been much activity on the server, you will not be able to steal useful data. Therefore, we need to interact with the web server as legitimate users. Let us do it as the administrator, and do the followings:

• Visit https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com from your browser.
• Login as the site administrator. (User Name: admin; Password: seedelgg)
• Add Boby as friend. (Go to More -> Members and click Boby -> Add Friend)
• Send Boby a private message.

After you have done enough interaction as legitimate users, you can launch the attack and see what information you can get out of the victim server. Writing the program to launch the Heartbleed attack from scratch is not easy, because it requires the low-level knowledge of the Heartbeat protocol. Fortunately, other people have already written the attack code. Therefore, we will use the existing code to gain first-hand experience in the Heartbleed attack. The code that we use is called attack.py, which was originally written by Jared Stafford. We made some small changes to the code for educational purposes. You can download the code from the lab’s web site, change its permission so the file is executable. You can then run the attack code as follows:

$ ./attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com

You may need to run the attack code multiple times to get useful data. Try and see whether you can get the following information from the target server.

• User name and password.
• User’s activity (what the user has done).
• The exact content of the private message.

For each piece of secret that you steal from the Heartbleed attack, you need to show the screen-dump as the proof and explain how you did the attack, and what your observations are.
3.2 Task 2: Find the Cause of the Heartbleed Vulnerability

In this task, students will compare the outcome of the benign packet and the malicious packet sent by the attacker code to find out the fundamental cause of the Heartbleed vulnerability.

The Heartbleed attack is based on the Heartbeat request. This request just sends some data to the server, and the server will copy the data to its response packet, so all the data are echoed back. In the normal case, suppose that the request includes 3 bytes of data ”ABC”, so the length field has a value 3. The server will place the data in the memory, and copy 3 bytes from the beginning of the data to its response packet. In the attack scenario, the request may contain 3 bytes of data, but the length field may say 1003. When the server constructs its response packet, it copies from the starting of the data (i.e. “ABC”), but it copies 1003 bytes, instead of 3 bytes. These extra 1000 bytes obviously do not come from the request packet; they come from the server’s private memory, and they may contain other user’s information, secret keys, password, etc.

![Figure 1: The Benign Heartbeat Communication](image)

In this task, we will play with the length field of the request. First, let’s understand how the Heartbeat response packet is built from Figure 1. When the Heartbeat request packet comes, the server will parse the packet to get the payload and the payload_length value (which is highlighted in Figure 1). Here, the payload is only a 3-byte string "ABC" and the payload_length value is exactly 3. The server program will blindly take this length value from the request packet. It then builds the response packet by pointing to the memory storing "ABC" and copy payload_length bytes to the response payload. In this way, the response packet would contain a 3-byte string "ABC".

We can launch the HeartBleed attack like what is shown in Figure 2. We keep the same payload (3 bytes), but set the payload_length field to 1003. The server will again blindly take this payload_length value when building the response packet. This time, the server program will point to the string "ABC" and copy 1003 bytes from the memory to the response packet as a payload. Besides the string ”ABC”, the extra 1000 bytes are copied into the response packet, which could be anything from the memory, such as secret activity, logging information, password and so on.

Our attack code allows you to play with different payload_length values. By default, the value is set to a quite large one (0x4000), but you can reduce the size using the command option "-l" (letter ell) or "--length" as shown in the following examples:

```
$./attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com -l 0x015B
$./attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com --length 83
```
Your task is to play with the attack program with different payload length values and answer the following questions:

- **Question 2.1:** As the length variable decreases, what kind of difference can you observe?

- **Question 2.2:** As the length variable decreases, there is a boundary value for the input length variable. At or below that boundary, the Heartbeat query will receive a response packet without attaching any extra data (which means the request is benign). Please find that boundary length. You may need to try many different length values until the web server sends back the reply without extra data. To help you with this, when the number of returned bytes is smaller than the expected length, the program will print "Server processed malformed Heartbeat, but did not return any extra data."

### 3.3 Task 3: Countermeasure and Bug Fix

To fix the Heartbleed vulnerability, the best way is to update the OpenSSL library to the newest version. This can be achieved using the following commands. It should be noted that once it is updated, it is hard to go back to the vulnerable version. Therefore, make sure you have finished the previous tasks before doing the update. You can also take a snapshot of your VM before the update.

```
$ sudo apt-get update
$ sudo apt-get upgrade
```

**Task 3.1** Try your attack again after you have updated the OpenSSL library. Please describe your observations.

**Task 3.2** The objective of this task is to figure out how to fix the Heartbleed bug in the source code. The following C-style structure (not exactly the same as the source code) is the format of the Heartbeat request/response packet.

```c
struct {
    HeartbeatMessageType type; // 1 byte: request or the response
    uint16 payload_length; // 2 byte: the length of the payload
```
opaque payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload_length];
opaque padding[padding_length];
} HeartbeatMessage;

The first field (1 byte) of the packet is the type information, and the second field (2 bytes) is the payload length, followed by the actual payload and paddings. The size of the payload should be the same as the value in the payload_length field, but in the attack scenario, payload_length can be set to a different value. The following code snippet shows how the server copies the data from the request packet to the response packet.

Listing 1: Process the Heartbeat request packet and generate the response packet

```c
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte  
 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus  
 * payload, plus padding  
 */

unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */

// Read from type field first
hbtype = *p++; /* After this instruction, the pointer  
 * p will point to the payload_length field *. 

// Read from the payload_length field  
// from the request packet
n2s(p, payload); /* Function n2s(p, payload) reads 16 bits  
 * from pointer p and store the value  
 * in the INT variable "payload". */

pl=p; // pl points to the beginning of the payload content

if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
    unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
    int r;

    /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte  
     * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus  
     * payload, plus padding  
     */

    buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
    bp = buffer;

    // Enter response type, length and copy payload
    *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
    s2n(payload, bp);

    // copy payload
    memcpy(bp, pl, payload); /* pl is the pointer which  
     * points to the beginning  
     * of the payload content */
```
bp += payload;

// Random padding
RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);

// this function will copy the 3+payload+padding bytes
// from the buffer and put them into the heartbeat response
// packet to send back to the request client side.
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
    3 + payload + padding);
}

Please point out the problem from the code in Listing 1 and provide a solution to fix the bug (i.e., what modification is needed to fix the bug). You do not need to recompile the code; just describe how you can fix the problem in your lab report.

Moreover, please comment on the following discussions by Alice, Bob, and Eva regarding the fundamental cause of the Heartbleed vulnerability: Alice thinks the fundamental cause is missing the boundary checking during the buffer copy; Bob thinks the cause is missing the user input validation; Eva thinks that we can just delete the length value from the packet to solve everything.

4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report, with screenshots, to describe what you have done and what you have observed. You also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising. Please also list the important code snippets followed by explanation. Simply attaching code without any explanation will not receive credits.